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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ELIZABETH VICTORIA COOK, 
Defendant and Appellant, 
v. Case No. 20150847-CA 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Appellee. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION 
UT.AH CODE ANN. §78A-4-103(2)(e) and UT. R. APP. P. 3 provide this Court with 
jurisdiction over this appeal from the Judgment, Sentence and Commitment, dated October 6, 
2015, (the "Judgment") by the Honorable Keith C. Barnes of the Fifth District Court, in 
and for Iron County, State of Utah. A copy of the Judgment is attached hereto as 
Addendum "A" and incorporated herein by this reference. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL, PRESERVATION, 
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
ISSUE I: Did the trial court proper!J find and conclude that Cook exhibited actual 
physical control of the four-wheeler while riding as a passenger and while 
intoxicated to support a conviction far DUI? 
PRESERVATION: Cook's defense at trial was that her 10-year-old daughter was 
the one driving the four-wheeler and that she had not exhibited any control over such 
vehicle while riding on it as a passenger. R0123-1048. The court found that Cook had 
control in three (3) ways: (1) by maneuvering the handlebars (from the officer's brief 
observation as the vehicle was coming to a stop); (2) by giving commands to her daughter as 
to how to drive it; and (3) by helping her daughter turn the vehicle by placing her hands on 
her daughter's shoulders to guide her how to steer it. 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW (UT. R. APP. P. 9(c)(7)(B)): 
"Ultimate factual determinations such as this are limited by legal principles that guide a trial 
court in its fact finding function." State v. Barnhart, 850 P.2d 473, 475 (Utah App. 1993); see 
State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1268-1272 (Utah 1993). ''These legal guidelines create a 
field of inquiry within which the trial court can make its ultimate factual findings." Id., citing 
State v. Richardson, 843 P.2d 517, 521-22 (Utah App. 1992)(Bench, P.J., concurring). ''Whether 
or not a trial court operated within the proper field of inquiry is a determination we make 
using a correction-of-error standard of review." Id., see Thurman at 1271-1272; Richardson at 
522 (Bench, P.J., concurring). ''We do not, however, apply the correction-of-error standard 
to every aspect of a trial court's finding of ultimate fact." Id. at 476. ''The correction-of-
error standard is intended to allow us to review and correct the trial court's determination of 
'the legal content' of an ultimate finding." Id., citing Thurman at 1271-1272. ''We defer, on 
the other hand, to the trial court's findings of underlying facts." Id., citing Thurman at 1271-
1272. "Consequently, we defer to a trial court's judgment of a debatable issue made within 
the trial court's proper realm of factual inquiry, such as a finding based on the totality of the 
circumstances." Id. "Absent a violation of legal guidelines, a trial court's finding of ultimate 
fact remains on the same level as any other underlying factual finding, and we defer." Id. see 
Lopez v. Schwendiman, 720 P.2d 778, 780 (defer to trial court's finding of actual physical 
2 
control unless trial court misapplied the law or the finding was clearly against the weight of 
the evidence); Gania v. Schewendiman, 645 P.2d 651,653 (Utah 1982) (same). 
ISSUE II: Did the trial court err in finding that the officer had proper!J conducted the 
Baker test given that no information as to synchronization of dijfering 
timing devices was presented to ensure the mandated 15 minute time frame 
had been undertaken? 
PRESERVATION: Cook objected during the trial on a foundation basis when the 
officer was unable to verify the synchronization of the two (2) different timing devices 
utilized in administering the Baker test on Cook. R108. 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW (UT. R. APP. P. 9(c)(7)(B)): A trial 
court's detennination as to admissibility based on foundation or lack thereof will not be 
overturned "unless there is a showing of an abuse of discretion." State v. Re!Jea, 2012 UT 
.App ,i 16, 288 P.3d 278, dting Vialpando at ,i 13 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
ISSUE III: Was Cook's trial counsel ineffective for failing to follow-through on the 
suppression motion filed with regard to unreasonable detainment for 
investigative purposes? 
PRESERVATION: "We have previously stated that two conditions should be met 
before we will treat the merits of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal. 
In State v. Humphries, we stated that 'ineffective assistance of counsel should be raised on 
appeal if [1] the trial record is adequate to permit decision of the issue and [2] defendant is 
represented by counsel other than trial counsel." State v. Utherland, 2000 UT App 76, ,I 9, 12 
P.3d 92 dting Humphries, 818 P.2d 1027, 1029 (Utah 1991); see also State v. Hovater, 914 P.2d 
37, 40 (Utah 1996). 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW (UT. R. APP. P. 9(c)(7)(B)): 'With 
respect to any ineffectiveness claim, a defendant must first demonstrate that counsel's 
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performance was deficient, in that it fell below an objective standard of reasonable 
professional judgment ... Second, the defendant must show that counsel's deficient 
performance was prejudicial - i.e., that it affected the outcome of the case." Litherland at iJ 
19, dting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 -88, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 
(1984) (additional citations omitted). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
A. U.S. CONST. AMEND. VI states the following: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 
public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall 
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by 
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusations; to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for 
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his 
defense. 
B. UTAH CODE ANN. §41-6a-502 (1) states the following: 
A person may not operate or be in actual physical control of a vehicle within 
this state if the person: 
(a) has sufficient alcohol in the person's body that a subsequent chemical 
test shows that the person has a blood or breath alcohol concentration 
of .08 grams or greater at the time of the test; 
(b) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined influence 
of alcohol and any drug to a degree that renders the person incapable 
of safely operating a vehicle; or 
( c) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater at 
the time of operation or actual physical control. 
C. UTAH CODE ANN. §41-22-2(1 l)(b) states that a "motor vehicle" includes an 
off-highway vehicle. 
D. UTAH CODE .ANN. §41-22-2(15) states that "operator" means a person who is 
in actual physical control of an off-highway vehicle. 
E. UT. R. CRIM. P. 12(d) states that a motion to suppress evidence shall: 
(1) describe the evidence sought to be suppressed; 
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(2) set forth the standing of the movant to make the application; and 
(3) specify sufficient legal and factual grounds for the motion to give the 
opposing party reasonable notice of the issues and to enable the court to 
determine what proceedings are appropriate to address them. 
F. UT R. EVID. 104(b): Relevance that depends on a fact. When the relevance of 
evidence depends on whether a fact exits, proof must be introduced sufficient 
to support a finding that the fact does exist. The court may admit the 
proposed evidence on the condition that the proof be introduced later. 
G. UT. R. EVID. 401: Test for Relevant Evidence. Evidence is relevant if: 
(a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be 
without the evidence; and 
(b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action. 
H. UT. R. EVID. 403: Excluding Relevant Evidence for Prejudice, Confusion, 
Waste of Time, or Other Reasons. The court may exclude relevant evidence if 
its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of 
the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, 
undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
On January 3, 2015, Iron County Sheriff Deputy .A. Burton ("Burton") cited and 
summoned Cook with a DUI Summons and Citation for the offenses of Driving Under the 
Influence of .. Alcohol and/ or Drugs with Passengers Under Sixteen Years of Age, a class A 
misdemeanor; and Open Container in a Vehicle, a class C misdemeanor. ROOS. On January 
9, 2015, the State filed an Information charging Cook with Driving Under the Influence of 
.Alcohol and/ or Drugs, a class A Misdemeanor; and Open Container in a Vehicle a class C 
Misdemeanor. R007-8. 
On January 20, 2015, Cook was before the trial court for an initial appearance. R015. 
Cook waived the reading of the Information. Id. Cook indicated that she planned to hire 
private counsel and did not want to enter a plea. Id. The trial court entered non-guilty pleas 
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onto the record so that the case would proceed through the system. Id. On March 25, 2015, 
Cook's Affidavit of Indigenry was filed with the trial court. R025. The trial court found Cook 
to be indigent and appointed Jack Burns ("Bums") to represent her. R0030. 
On March 31, 2015, a status conference was held. R042. During the hearing, Burns 
requested that the jury trial scheduled for April 8, 2015, be continued because he had just 
been appointed to represent Cook. Id. The State did not object to the continuance. Id. The 
trial court granted Bum's motion to continue the jury trial. Id. 
On July 15, 2015, Cook was before the trial court for a preliminary hearing. After the 
presentation of evidence and testimony, the trial court found that there was sufficient 
evidence to proceed towards trial. R054. Cook was bound-over on Driving Under the 
Influence of Alcohol and/or Drugs, a class A misdemeanor. Id. The trial court dismissed 
the Open Container charge. Id. Cook waived the reading of the Information and entered a 
not-guilty plea. Id. 
On July 16, 2015, Burns filed a Motion to Suppress (the "Motion''). R060. The Motion 
requested the trial court suppress any and all evidence obtained via a police search of the 
personal property of Cook, all statements that Cook made to police and/ or other state 
agents, and results of tests conducted on any alleged evidence seized from Cook. Id. The 
Motion indicated that Cook had standing to move for the suppression of the above-
referenced items/ evidence because the search was conducted on her person. Id. The Motion 
stated that Cook had been seized and transported to the Iron County Jail (the "Jail'') 
without probable cause. Id. The Motion requested that evidence obtained subsequent to the 
seizure be suppressed. Id. 
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Cook's bench trial occurred on September 17, 2015. R066-7. After the trial court 
received witness testimony and evidence, Cook was found guilty of the offense of Driving 
Under the Influence of Alcohol and/ or Drugs, a class A misdemeanor. Id. 
On October 6, 2015, Cook was sentenced and the Judgment was entered. R069. The 
Judgment indicated that Cook was sentenced to serve a term of three hundred sixty-four 
(364) days in the Iron County Jail for the offense of Driving Under the Influence of 
.Alcohol/Drugs, a class A misdemeanor. R070. The trial court suspended three hundred 
sixty-two (362) days of the imposed sentence. Id. Cook was ordered to pay a fine in the 
amount of one thousand five hundred dollars ($1500), with a fifty dollar ($50) payment 
being made on the first of each month beginning on December 1, 2015. Id. 
.Also on October 6, 2015, the Judgment, Sentence and Probation Order (the 
"Probation Order") was entered. R072. The Probation Order indicated that Cook was 
placed on probation for a period of twenty-four (24) months with probation to be 
supervised through Private Probation. Id. Cook was ordered to sign-up for Private 
Probation within forty-eight ( 48) hours. Id. She was ordered to serve two (2) days in Jail 
beginning on October 9, 2015. Id. Cook was ordered to pay a one thousand five hundred 
dollar ($1500) dollar fine, including a 90% surcharge and a court security fee in the amount 
of forty-three dollars ($43). Id. She was ordered to reimburse Iron County for her court-
appointed attorney in the amount of one hundred dollars ($100) and ordered to obey all laws 
and commit no further violations of law. Id. Cook was ordered to obtain an alcohol/ drug 
assessment evaluation, which was to be filed with the trial court on or before December 1, 
2015. R072. She was also ordered to not possess or consume alcoholic beverages, sign a 
7 
consent-to-release treatment form to be accessed by authorized individuals, submit to 
warrantless searches of her person and/ or property, submit a DNA sample and pay the 
required fee, and keep the trial court informed of any change in address. Id. 
Counsel herein entered his Notice of Appearance-Appellate Matter on October 13, 2015. 
R076. On October 13, 2015, the jail sent a letter to the trial court. R078. The letter 
indicated that Cook failed to appear for her two (2) day commitment as was so ordered in 
the Probation Order. Id. An Amended Commitment Order was filed with the trial court on 
October 15, 2015, commanding the Iron County Sheriff to take Cook and deliver her to the 
Jail on October 16, 2015, to serve her two (2) day commitment. ROSS. Offender 
Management Solutions ("OMS"), a private probation provider company, emailed an 
Activation Report to the trial court on October 16, 2015, which indicated that Cook entered 
into an agreement with OMS for her probation supervision. R089. 
On October 22, 2015, Southwest Behavioral Health Center counselor Rylee Munn, 
submitted a letter to the trial court which indicated that Cook participated in a Drug and 
Alcohol Evaluation at the Horizon House on October 20, 2015. R091. The letter stated that, 
''based on the results of the Evaluation, [Cook] appeared to score in a fashion similar to 
someone who [was] chemically dependent." Id Munn recommended that Cook attend and 
complete day treatment at the Horizon House. Id 
On December 3, 2015, Southwest Behavioral Health Center filed a letter with the trial 
court. R174. The letter stated that, on November 11, 2015, Cook entered into residential 
treatment at the Horizon House. Id Cook's treatment was estimated to last for 
approximately ninety (90) days. Id 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. Bench Trial - September 17, 2015 
On September 17, 2015, the matter came for a bench trial. R095. The State passed 
on giving an opening statement. Id. Burns reserved the giving of his opening statement. 
R096. Burns pointed out that an error had occurred on the court calendar. Id. Burns stated 
that the court calendar showed two (2) pending charges for Cook; however, count two (2) 
had been dismissed at the preliminary hearing. Id. The State understood as well that count 
two (2) had been dismissed. Id. The trial proceeded only on count one (1). Id. The State 
presented their case by calling their first witness. Id. 
1. Direct-Examination of Burton 
Burton was a fully certified Category I Peace Officer employed with the Iron County 
Sheriff's Office for the past nine (9) years as a patrol supervisor and canine handler. R097. 
Burton was POST certified in field-sobriety tests and Intoxilyzer certification. Id. He was 
also ARIDE certified, meaning ..Advanced Roadside Impairment Enforcement. Id. Burton 
estimated that he had been involved in approximately seventy-five (JS) to one hundred (100) 
DUI investigations Id. 
On January 3, 2015, Burton was responding to another matter when he allegedly 
observed Cook on a four-wheeler coming towards him at a high rate of speed. R098. 
Burton stopped his vehicle and the four-wheeler slid to a stop. Id. The roads were covered 
with snow. Id. Burton made contact with the four-wheeler which consisted of three 
passengers to wit: J.C. in the front, Cook in the middle and James Himmel ("Himmel") on 
the back. Id. When asked if he noticed or saw who had been steering the four-wheeler, 
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Burton testified that "Elizabeth Cook had her hand on the handlebars when I made initial 
contact ... " R099. Cook was also holding a beer can. Id. Burton allegedly never observed 
J.C. operating the four-wheeler. R101. Burton identified that Himmel was only eighteen 
(18) years old. Id. Himmel admitted to Burton that he had a cap of hard alcohol at his 
mother's home. Id. Burton could smell an odor of alcohol on Cook, she was belligerent, 
had slurred speech and bloodshot eyes. Id. and R102. Cook admitted to Burton that she had 
drank a little bit that day and that it had been her daughter, J.C., who was driving the four-
wheeler not her. Id. Burton located the beer can he observed Cook holding on the ground 
near her feet. Id. Burton also found a second beer can in the pocket of Cook's coat. Id. 
Burton cited Himmel for under-age consumption and transported Cook to Jail. Id. 
While at the Jail, Burton conducted the Standardized Field-Sobriety Tests ("FSTs") 
on Cook. R103. Burton explained that FSTs are standardized tests that show the level of 
alcohol and/ or impairment that may be on a person or in their blood. Id. FSTs consisted of 
horizontal gaze nystagmus, the walk-and-tum, and the one-legged stand. Id. The first FST 
Burton had Cook perform was the horizontal gaze nystagmus. R104. He observed six (6) 
out of six (6) clues. Id. Secondly, Burton had Cook perform the walk-and-tum. Id. He 
observed six (6) out of eight (8) clues. R105. Lastly, Burton performed the one-legged stand 
on Cook. Id. He observed three (3) out of six (6) clues. Id. No portable breath test was 
conducted upon Cook. R106. Burton gave Cook a breath-alcohol concentration ("BAC'') 
test using the Intoxilyzer ("Intoxilyzer") Machine 8000. Id. Burton had previously received 
training on how to operate the Intxoilyzer. Id. The Intoxilyzer had been calibrated before 
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and after Cook's BAC. Id. Burton identified State's Exhibit I as the calibration certificates 
for the Intoxilyzer. Id. 
Burton observed Baker on Cook. R107. Burton explained that Baker tested for 
"mouth alcohol." Id. In order to observe Baker, you have the person open their mouth and 
lift up their tongue. Id. and R108. The purpose of Baker is to ensure that nothing was in the 
person's mouth and that no regurgitation or belching occurred prior to BAC testing. Id. 
After observing Baker, Burton received consent from Cook to conduct the BAC. Id. 
Burns raised an objection on the basis of foundation arguing that not all of the Baker 
element requirements had been met through the State's line of questioning. Id. Burns also 
argued in his objection that no questions had been asked whether Burton was certified to use 
the lntoxilyzer. Id. Burns objection was sustained. Id. 
Burton was certified to use the Intoxilyzer. Id Burton observed Baker at 14:34. 
R 109. Baker is observed for fifteen (15) minutes. Id. Burton did not observe Cook to have 
any regurgitation, belching nor eat or drink anything during the fifteen (15) minute period of 
observation. Id Burton observed Baker at 14:34 and gave the BAC test at 14:51. Rl 10. Mr. 
Burns requested and was allowed to ask Burton a few questions on voir dire towards 
foundation. Id. 
2. Voir Dire Examination of Burton 
Burton verified that he recorded the time of 14:34. Id Burton "probably used his 
cell phone" to note the time of Baker but could not recall if that is what he had done. 
Burton stated that he nonnally used his cell phone to note the time. R111. Burton 
administered the B.AC test on Cook at 14:51 and he pulled that time off of the Intoxilyzer 
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receipt. Id. Burton did not enter the time of 14:51 into the Intoxilyzer; the Intoxilyzer 
entered the time. Id. 
Burns objected to the admission of the BAC results because two (2) separate time 
pieces were used and no testimony was offered as to whether the two (2) separate times 
pieces were synchronized. R112. Burns also objected that no testimony was offered 
regarding the specific amount of time that elapsed between the time recorded and the time 
of Baker. Id. Burns argued that Baker is a foundational issue in order for evidence to be 
admissible. Id. Burns argued that the fifteen (15) minute time requirement on Baker is a strict 
compliance admissibility issue and that it is part of the foundational requirement in order for 
the B..AC test results to be offered as evidence. R113. 
The State argued that Burns should have brought up this issue as to the admissibility 
of the BAC being submitted as evidence prior to trial Id. The trial court indicated that a 
Motion was filed by Burns on July 16, 2015; however the Motion was vague and did not 
provide details of what it contained. Id. Burns stated "obviously he had not followed 
through with the Motion." Rl 14. 
Burns indicated that during suppression hearing, he would address any issues there 
may be with Baker. Id. The trial court asked for a case to guide them on the factual 
determination on whether or not the fifteen (15) minutes as set forth under the Baker 
standard was actually met and whether Baker was a weight or admissibility issue. Id. Burns 
indicated that State v. Ramirez is Utah's Baker case. Id. The trial court indicated that the 
remainder of the evidence would be heard first and the Burns would brief the Ramirez case. 
Id. 
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The trial court allowed Burton to finish answering the questions because evidence 
was offered to show that the fifteen (15) minute requirement had been met, because of two 
(2) electronic devices that gave a two (2) minute cushion. R115. The court indicated that 
seventeen (17) minutes on competing devices did meet the fifteen (15) minute Baker 
requirement. R116. The trial court allowed Burns to continue with his voir dire questioning. 
Id. Burton did not use his cell phone to time the fifteen (15) minutes when he observed 
Baker. Id. Burton explained that the officer physically entered the time from his cell phone 
in the Intoxilyzer. Id. The Intoxilyzer then counted down the fifteen (15) minutes from the 
time that was manually entered in. Id. As soon as the Baker test was finished, the Intoxilyzer 
went through air blank and the diagnostic testing, which resulted in the gap of time. Rl 17. 
Burton explained that the results did not show that he gave the BAC test at 14:51 and that 
Baker was also observed at 14:51. Id. To clarify what he meant, Burton stated that "I typed 
it in and then observed Baker for fifteen (15) minutes on the machine, so the machine did 
the fifteen (15) minute timing thing." Id. Burton further explained that the Intoxilyzer 
requested certain information such as: driver license number; name; officer name; case 
number; and time observed, where he types in the time manually. Id. After the information 
was manually entered, the officer would "press start" to begin the Baker fifteen (15) minute 
countdown. Id. . Burton assumed that the Intoxilyzer had its own time set, but did not 
know for sure. R118. Burton stated that he was unsure where the Intoxilyzer pulled its time 
from because the Intoxilyzer was not plugged into an outside source such as the internet or a 
telephone line. Id. 
3. Continuation of Direct-Examination of Burton 
13 
Burton gave the BAC to Cook; which indicated a BAC of 0.119 grams. Rl 19. Burton 
told Cook the results of her BAC, placed her into a holding cell and filled out a probable 
cause statement to support her being booked into jail. R120. 
4. Cross-Examination of Burton 
Burton separated J.C., Cook and Himmel to speak with them individually. Id. When 
Burton questioned Cook, there was an issue as to whether she was the one operating the 
four-wheeler. Id. Burton did not talk with J.C. or Himmel as to who had been operating 
the four-wheeler. R121. At the conclusion of Burns direct examination of Burton, the State 
rested. Id. Burns called Cook as the first witness for the defense. Id. 
5. Direct-Examination of Cook 
On January 3, 2015, Cook was at a cabin that belonged to family friends. R123. 
Also on that date, Cook and J.C. were on a four-wheeler; with J.C. sitting in front driving the 
four-wheeler. Id. Cook did not operate the four-wheeler. R 124. Cook put her hands on 
the handlebars when they stopped quickly as a way to protect J.C. Id. Cook did not operate 
the accelerator, the brakes, and the clutch nor steer the four-wheeler. Id. Cook was a 
passenger while J.C. operated the four-wheeler. Id. 
6. Cross-Examination of Cook 
Cook was at the cabin on a family outing. R128. It was not snowing. Id. It had 
snowed days prior. R129. It was a sunny day, however Cook and J.C. both were wearing 
coats and gloves. Id. Cook did not know brands and sizes of four-wheelers, but the four-
wheeler they had been on was big enough for three people. Id. Cook and her family had 
been to the cabin owned by the Himmels several times prior to the date in question. R130. 
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Cook had operated the four-wheeler before. Id. At the time of this family outing, J.C. was 
ten (10) years old. Id. J.C. had also been on the four-wheeler before and had received 
training on how to operate four-wheelers. Id. When the four-wheeler slid to a stop, Cook 
was concerned for J.C.'s safety so she reached forward and placed her hands in the middle of 
the handlebars in front of J.C. as a way to protect her. R131. The only time Cook had her 
hands on the handlebars was when she was protecting J.C. R132. Cook never operated the 
four-wheeler. Id. Cook and her husband gave J.C. training on how to properly stop and 
operate four-wheeler, as well as how many riders can safely be on the four-wheeler at one 
time. R133. 
7. Direct-Examination of J.C. 
J.C. was operating the four-wheeler when they were stopped by the officer. R136. 
J.C. was in the front, Cook in the middle and Himmel on the back of the four-wheeler. 
R137. When J.C. first got onto the four-wheeler, she was sitting in the middle so that 
Himmel could start it Id. and R138. Once the four-wheeler was started, J.C. moved into the 
front position and drove. R138. J.C. stated that Cook protected her from almost crashing 
but otherwise just directed by saying 'turn this way' and held J.C.'s shoulders. Id. J.C. was 
using the accelerator. Id. J.C. does not recall Cook ever operating the four-wheeler. Id. 
8. Cross-Examination of J.C. 
Himmel taught J.C. how to ride the four-wheeler. R140. J.C. had only ridden on a 
four-wheeler a few times prior to January 3, 2015. Id. The four-wheeler was large enough 
for three (3) people. Id. Cook told J.C. which way to turn and how to stop the four-wheeler. 
R141. The only time J.C. felt scared while driving the four-wheeler was when she almost 
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swerved off the road to stop for the Officer. Id. J.C. felt in control of the four-wheeler. 
R142. Cook held J.C.'s shoulders and told her to "be careful." Id. J.C. does not recall Cook 
ever placing her hands on the handlebars of the four-wheeler. R143. Cook only placed her 
hands on J.C. shoulders and said: "hurry up and push the brakes or we're going to crash." 
Id. 
9. Direct-Examination of Himmel 
Himmel knew Cook. R145. Himmel recalled interacting with the officer on January 
3, 2015. R146. Himmel was on the back of the four-wheeler. R147. Himmel helped to 
stop the four-wheeler by placing his foot on the foot brake. Id. Himmel's position was 
passenger. R148. Himmel never observed Cook operating the four-wheeler. Id. 
At the conclusion of Himmel's testimony, Burns rested. Id. The State called Burton 
as a rebuttal witness. Id. 
10. Direct-Examination of Rebuttal Witness Burton 
Burton had previous interaction with four-wheelers. R149. He recognized that Cook 
was on an Arctic Cat 500, which was a large four-wheeler. Id. 
11. Closing Arguments 
At the conclusion of testimony and evidence, the trial court heard arguments from 
the State and Burns. R150. The State argued that they had met the burden of proving the 
elements for Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol and/or Drugs with a Minor. Id. The 
State believed it had shown through evidence and testimony that Cook was in control and 
operating the four-wheeler. Id. The State argued against the defense theory that J.C. was 
operating the four-wheeler simply because J.C. could not start the four-wheeler on her own. 
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Id. Burton observed Cook with her hands on the handlebars. Id. Cook's BAC results 
indicated that she was above the legal limit and that J.C. was on the four-wheeler with her. 
R151. The State requested that the trial count convict Cook of Driving Under the Influence 
of .Alcohol and/ or Drugs with a Minor. Id. 
Burns argued that a passenger on a vehicle could not constitute actual physical 
control over that vehicle. R152. Burns argued that all the evidence before the trial court 
proved that J.C. was operating the four-wheeler, not Cook. R153. Burns argued that the 
State had not met its burden beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. Burns requested the trial court 
acquit Cook on the charge of Driving Under the Influence of .Alcohol and/ or Drugs with a 
Minor. Id. 
During rebuttal, the State further argued that it was not possible for a nine (9) year 
old girl of J.C.'s size and physicality to have been in control of the four-wheeler. Id. The 
four-wheeler was an .Arctic Cat, which is a large four-wheeler. R154. Cook was operating 
and in control of the four-wheeler. R155. 
The trial court did not believe J.C. was big enough "to do everything she [needed] to 
do on an .Arctic Cat 500." R157. The trial court did not "[believe] that J.C. could shift, 
reach the breaks and run the accelerator because her body [was] not big enough." Id. The 
trial court could not see that a mother would put their nine (9) year old child on a four-
wheeler and say "drive." Id. The trial court stated that in a crisis the adult would take control 
over the vehicle so that they did not wreck and no harm came upon themselves or their 
children. R158. The court believed that, by Cook's own admission as to her actions taken 
to protect J.C., that she admitted she had control of the vehicle. Id. The trial court found 
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three (3) different ways that Cook had "actual physical control" of the four-wheeler. Id. 
First, Cook was driving. Id. Cook maneuvered the handlebars. Id. Secondly, Cook gave 
commands to a person in control. Id. The trial court stated that accomplice liability statute 
implied that "if you are participating then you are doing it." Id. Third, J.C. testified that 
Cook took control the four-wheeler to get it started. R159. The trial court found Cook 
guilty of the offense of Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol/ or Drugs. Id. Burns 
requested that Cook be sentenced according to the timeframe permitted by the statute. Id. 
Sentencing was scheduled for October 6, 2015. Id. Burns expressed to the trial court that 
he no longer wanted to brief the issue about the Intoxilyzer and the standard of Baker 
because Burton testified under Voit Dire to the workings of the Intoxilyzer. R160. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court committed error in failing to properly conclude that Cook exhibited 
"actual physical control" over the four-wheeler. The "totality of the circumstances" were 
not met to support Cook's conviction of Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol and/or 
Drugs. Testimony was offered through Cook's daughter J.C., who stated that she had been 
operating the four-wheeler, and Himmel testified that he used the foot brake in order to help 
the four-wheeler stop. Himmel had exercised actual physical control of the vehicle, but Cook 
had not. The four-wheeler had to stop suddenly once Burton was spotted. Given that the 
roads were snow packed and the four-wheeler started sliding, Cook felt concerned for the 
safety of J.C. and raised her hands in front of J.C. in order to protect her from harm; with 
her hands landing on the middle of the handlebars. What was observed by the officer was 
that "Elizabeth Cook had her hand on the handlebars when I made initial contact ... " R099. 
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No further testimony was offered by the State that Cook had exhibited any other actions 
required to be in "actual physical control" of the four-wheeler. Cook was convicted of the 
offense of Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol and/or Drugs, a class A misdemeanor. 
In order for Cook's BAC test results to be admissible as relevant evidence, the 
standard three (3) steps Baker requirement needed to be met. The State presented evidence 
to suggest that the first two steps of Baker had been met. Specifically, the State introduced 
evidence that the Intoxilyzer had been calibrated and that Burton had received training on 
how to properly work the Intoxilyzer and administer a BAC; however, the third requirement 
of Baker was not met. The third requirement was that Baker was observed for the fifteen 
(15) minute time period. The evidence introduced by the State as to the fifteen (15) 
observation period was that Burton used his cell phone to note the time of Baker in the 
Intoxilyzer machine, and the Intoxilyzer machine counted 15 minutes from that time taken 
from a different device, then the print-out sheet noted the time from the Intoxilyzer 
machine that the BAC was administered. The State neglected to introduce any evidence that 
would show that the two differing timing devices were synchronized. The trial court 
committed error in determining that the Baker fifteen (15) minute observation period had 
been sufficiently met in order for Cook's BAC to be admissible. 
A suppression hearing was "critical' to Cook. Burns rendered "ineffective assistance 
of counsel" for failure to follow-through with the Motion that he filed on behalf of Cook. 
Burns Motion correctly laid out the evidence that needed to be suppressed; however, he 
neglected to articulate legal and factual authority to support what he was seeking be 
suppressed. Burns was also "ineffective" for failure to have a suppression hearing. The 
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Motion to Suppress was crucial to Cook because it addressed issues with Baker and the 
admittance of her BAC. Burns ineffectiveness impacted Cook and the outcome of her case. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN FAILING TO 
PROPERLY FIND AND CONCLUDE THAT COOK EXHIBITED 
ACTUAL CONTROL OF THE FOUR-WHEELER WHILE 
INTOXICATED TO SUPPORT A CONVICTION FOR A DUI. 
According to UTAH CODE ANN. 41-22-2(1 l)(b) an off-highway vehicle is considered a 
motor vehicle. "Operator" has been defined as a "person who is in actual physical control of 
an off-highway vehicle.'' UTAH CODE ANN. 41-22-2(15). "[A]ctual physical control' in its 
ordinary sense means 'existing' or 'present bodily restraint, directing influence, domination 
or regulation." State v. Vialpando, 2004 UT App 95, ,I 21, 89 P.3d 209 (citations omitted). 
Concerning the scope of "actual physical control," this Court concluded that "the 
determination must be made through examining the 'totality of the circumstances."' Id. at 1 
22, dting State v. Bugger, 25 Utah 2d 404,483 P.2d 442,478 (1971). 
In a jurisdiction where the negligence of a driver can be imputed to the passenger if 
the driver and passenger are found to be in an agent/ principal relationship, the court 
undertook an analysis as to whether a passenger giving directions to the driver and the driver 
following such direction creates an agency relationship. Benson v. Sorrell, 627 N.E.2d 866 (Ind. 
App. 1994). The Benson court analyzed a case that had found the passenger "had the right to 
give her husband directions and, to be sure, could well have had a duty to warn if and only if 
she knew of an impending danger and the husband-driver was unaware of its presence." Id. 
at 868, tiling Leuck v. Goe~ 151 Ind.App. 528, 280 N.E.2d 847, 855 (1972). In another case, 
the Benson court noted that control could not be imputed to a passenger where no evidence 
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showed they "had any control over the speed at which the automobile was traveling, the 
yielding or failure to yield the right of way at intersections, or any other of the elements 
which contributed to the manner in which the automobile proceeded along the route 
selected." Id., dting Shannon v. Hollingsworth, 291 Ala. 159, 163, 279 So.2d 428, 432 (1973). The 
Benson court further cited a case indicating that "the circumstances must be such that the 
occupant and the driver together had such control and direction over the automobile as to 
be practically in the joint or common possession of it." Id., dting Bryant v. Padftc Electric RR 
Co., 174 Cal. 737, 164 P. 385 (1917). The Benson court agreed with these cases and concluded 
that, "[m]erely giving a driver directions does not amount to control over the vehicle equal 
to that the driver exercises." Id. at 869. The control was instead the manner in which the 
operator themselves choose to drive the vehicle, regardless of any directions given, which 
the Benson court found appropriate since otherwise intoxicated individuals taking a taxi cab 
and providing directions would still implicate them for DUI. Id. at 868-869, dting Churchill v. 
Briggs, 225 Iowa 1187, 1190, 282 N.W. 280,282 (1938)(quoting Cram v. City of Des Moines, 185 
Iowa 1292, 172 N.W. 23 (1919)); see also 8 . Am.Jur.2d Automobiles§ 706(" ... the mere giving 
of directions to the driver does not establish that the passenger has control over the 
vehicle."). 
In State v. Sanche~ the Kansas appeal court recently undertook an analysis indicating 
taht an intoxicated passenger can exert actual physical control over a vehicle by grabbing the 
steering wheel while in the passenger seat and altering the vehicle's movement. Ibid., 48 
Kan.App.2d 608, 296 P.3d 1133 (2013); see also 94 A.LR.6th 671 (2014). The recitation of 
cases in Sanchez all indicate that, "a passenger can exert actual physical control over a vehicle 
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by grabbing the steering wheel or by doing other things that cause the vehicle to move." Id. 
at 611-612, citing State v. Rivera, 207 Ariz. 69, 74, 83 P.3d 69 (2004)("[W]e conclude that, a 
passenger who grabs the steering wheel of a moving car and alters the car's movement has 
assumed actual physical control for purposes of the DUI statutes."); In re P.H., 192 
Ca.App.4th 1465, 1472, 122 Cal.Rptr.3d 43 (201 l)("The defendant ... grabbed the wheel and 
caused the vehicle to change direction and crash. By that act she made herself the driver as 
she exercised actual physical control over the vehicle."); People v. Yamat, 475 Mich. 49, 5758, ~· 
714 N.W.2d 335 (2006)("[D]efendnat's act of grabbing the steering wheel and thereby 
causing the car to veer off the road clearly constitutes 'actual physical control of a motor 
vehicle."'); People v. Crombleholme, 8 A.D.3d 1068, 1070, 778 N.Y.S.2d 256 
(2004)("Defendant's action in grabbing the steering wheel [as passenger[ and controlling the 
direction of the vehicle fall within the definition of operation of a motor vehicle."); City of 
Valley City v. Be~ 394 N.W.2d 690, 691 (N.D. 1986)(holding passenger exercised "actual 
physical control" by staritng the vehicle, after which it lurched forward and struck another 
vehicle); State v. Wallace, 166 Ohio App.3d 845, 849, 853 N.E.2d 704 (2006)(''Wallace's 
conduct [as passenger] caused movement of the vehicle and the driver's loss of control when 
she grabbed the steering wheel and caused the vehicle to crash."); Moe v. MVD, 133 Or.App. 
75, 79, 889 P.2d 1334 (1995)(holding passenger was a "driver" by turning on the ignition and 
inadvertently putting the car into gear, causing it to move); Com. Dept. ofTransp. v. Hoover, 161 
Pa.Cmwlth. 517, 522, 637 A.2d 721 (1994)("When a passenger in a vehicle chooses to 
engage in such foolish conduct as grabbing the steering wheel ... that person is assuming 
actual physical control.''); Dugger v. Com., 40 Va.App. 586, 594, 580 S.E.2d 477 (2003)("By 
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forcibly taking the steering over from the driver, appellant manipulated perhaps the most 
fundamental feature of a moving vehicle-the direction in which it would travel. That 
deliberate act placed him in actual physical control of the vehicle."); In re Arambu4 37 
Wash.App. 805, 808, 683 P.2d 1123 (1984)("[M]omentary grabbing of the steering wheel of a 
vehicle [by the passenger] comes within the ordinary meaning of the term 'actual physical 
control."'). The Sanchez court concluded "that a passenger becomes the driver or operator 
when he or she grabs the steering wheel and alters the vehicle's movement." Id. at 613. 
\Vhen an ultimate finding of fact is made in violation of a legal guideline, we correct it 
under a correction-of-error standard of review. State l'. F.nchell, 850 P.2d 480, 485 (Utah .App 
1993)dting State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1271-72 (Utah 1993) (using corrcction-of-
crror standard allows appellate court to consider "legal content" of ultimate factual findings). 
These legal guidelines create a field of inquiry within which the trial court can make its 
ultimate factual findings. State v. Barnhart,. 850 P.2d 473 (Utah App 1993); titing State v. 
Richardson, 84 3 P .2d 517, 521-22 (Utah App.1992} (Bench, P .J ., concurring). Whether or not 
a trial court operated within the proper field of inquiry is a determination we make using a 
correction-of-error standard of review. See_. Th11rman at Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1271-
1272; Richardson, 843 P.2d at 522 (Bench, P.J., concurring). 
If an appellant asserts that the trial court has incorrectly identified the legal 
guidelines establishing its permissible field of inquiry, we use the correction-
of-error standard because the appellant has challenged the "legal content" of 
the trial court's finding. It~ on the other hand, an appellant cannot show that 
the trial court's ultimate finding was erroneous as a matter of law, the 
appellant is requesting nothing more than a second opinion on a debatable 
question of fact. In such cases, an appellant is simply challenging the trial 
court's judgment in its ultimate factual finding. Absent a violation of legal 
guidelines, a trial court's finding of ultimate fact remains on the same level as 
any other underlying factual finding, and we defer. 
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Lopez v. Schwendiman, 720 P.2d 778, 780; Gania v. Schwendiman, 645 P.2d 651, 653 (Utah 
1982) (same). The State must prove that Cook had an "'existing' or 'present bodily restraint, 
directing influence, domination or regulation"' over a vehicle. See, Vialpando at ,r 25 citing 
Bugger at 442. 
The trial court opined herein that, in a crisis, an adult would take control over the 
vehicle so that they did not wreck and no hann came upon themselves or their children. 
R158. The court believed that, by Cook's own admission as to her actions taken to protect 
J.C., that she admitted she had control of the vehicle. Id. The trial court thus found three (3) 
different ways that it believed Cook had "actual physical control" of the four-wheeler: Cook 
was driving and maneuvered the handlebars; Cook gave commands to a person in control; 
and, under theorizing the accomplice liability statute, if Cook was participating by placing her 
hands on her daughter's shoulders to guide her how to steer it, then she was controlling the 
vehicle. The court then mistakenly found that J.C. testified that Cook took control the four-
wheeler to get it started; however, the testimony was that Himmel had done so. R 159. 
During trial, Burton testified that he observed Cook driving towards him on a four-
wheeler on January 3, 2015. R098. The four-wheeler slid to a stop when Burton stopped his 
vehicle. Id. He observed that the four-wheeler contained three (3) passengers; J.C. was in 
the front, Cook in the middle and Himmel on the back. Id. Burton observed Cook's hands 
on the handlebars of the four-wheeler as it came to a stop. R099. Burton never observed 
J.C. operating the four-wheeler at all. R109. Cook informed Burton that J.C. had been the 
one driving the four-wheeler. Id. Burton never questioned J.C. or Himmel as to who had 
been driving the four-wheeler. R120. 
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Cook never operated the four-wheeler, the accelerator, the brakes, the clutch, nor 
steered the four-wheeler. Id. Cook was concerned with J.C.'s safety when the four-wheeler 
slid to a stop. R131. In order to protect J.C. from harm, Cook placed her hands in the 
middle of the handlebars directly in front of J.C. Id. Cook testified that the only time she 
placed her hands on the handlebars was when she was protecting J.C. Id. 
J.C. testified that she was operating the four-wheeler when they stopped for the 
officer. R136. Himmel started the four-wheeler for J.C. R137-8. J.C. used the accelerator. 
R139. J.C. did not recall Cook ever operating the four-wheeler. Id. Himmel testified that he 
was a passenger on the four-wheeler and that he used the foot brake to help stop the four-
wheeler. Rt 4 7. 
Cook was riding as a passenger on a vehicle operated by her daughter, J.C. See, UTAH 
CODE ANN. 41-22-2(1 l)(b). J.C. was in actual physical control of the vehicle according to 
testimony provided by Cook, Himmel and J.C. herself that she was directing influence, 
domination or regulation over the vehicle. UTAH CODE ANN. 41-22-2(15); Vialpando at ,I 21. 
The totality of the factual circumstances, together \vi.th the application of the law on the 
matter, dictated that J.C. was the sole person in actual physical control of the vehicle herein. 
Id. at ii 22, dting State v. Bugger, 25 Utah 2d 404, 483 P.2d 442,478 (1971). 
The court imputed actual physical control to Cook, who was a passenger on the 
vehicle due to a perceived agent/principal relationship. In other words, Cook was the 
operator's Q.C.'s) mother and the operator was a minor. Benson at 868. Specifically, the court 
discounted Cook's claim that she was protecting J.C. when he placed her hands on the 
steering wheel, but not seeking to operate the vehicle. The court found that, as a mother, she 
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was more likely taking control back to avoid a "crisis." However, the "crisis" was simply 
skidding to a stop on the snowy road when Burton motioned for them to do so. Himmel 
was the one who applied the brake to the vehicle. Burton's only testimony was that Cook's 
hands were on the steering wheel as he observed the vehicle slide and then come to a stop. 
In Sanchez and the line of cases cited therein, numerous courts have found actual physical 
control by a passenger when two facts are present: grabbing the steering wheel and causing 
the vehicle to move from its normal path. Ibid. at 611-612; Rivera, 207 Ariz. at 74, 83 P.3d 69; 
F.H., 192 Ca.App.4th at 1472, 122 Cal.Rptr.3d 43; Yamat, 475 Mich. at 57-58, 714 N.W.2d 
335; Crombleholme, 8 A.D.3d at 1070, 778 N.Y.S.2d 256; Be,;g, 394 N.W.2d at 691; Wallace, 166 
Ohio App.3d at 849, 853 N.E.2d 704; Moe, 133 Or.App. at 79, 889 P.2d 1334; Hoover, 161 
Pa.Cmwlth. at 522, 637 A.2d 721; Dugger, 40 Va.App. at 594, 580 S.E.2d 477; Arambul 37 
Wash.App. at 808, 683 P.2d 1123. While Cook contested that she maneuvered the steering 
wheel and had only placed her hands on them as they stopped to protect J.C., the district 
court clearly did not credit this in its theory that a mother would take back control in those 
situations. However, what was observed by and testified to by the officer was only that 
"Elizabeth Cook had her hand on the handlebars when I made initial contact ... " R099. The 
vehicle was already stopped at the time he claims to have observed her in this position. 
There was no testimony from Burton that he saw Cook grab the steering wheel or that he 
saw her cause the vehicle to move from its normal path-factors required to find that she 
took actual physical control from J.C. All Burton observed was that she had a hand on the 
handlebars when at a standstill. This is insufficient to find actual physical control for 
purposes of the DUI statute. 
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Even under Utah's statutory scheme which allows an attempted control to be 
sufficient to rise to "actual physical control" (i.e. in possession of keys whether the individual 
is located in or outside the vehicle), where there is a designated "operator" of the vehicle, 
another cannot take control without there being actual physical actions towards doing so. 
The line of cases in Sanchez support the concept that some physical control has to occur, 
which is in line with Utah's statutory scheme. For instance, if a passenger took the keys from 
the intoxicated individual, they would be taking their "actual physical control" element away; 
however, it required a physical action to deprive them of such. Herein, Cook was required to 
have not only grabbed the whee~ but also moved the vehicle from the operator's Q.C.) 
chosen path .. All Burton observed was Cook's hand on the steering wheel while the vehicle 
was at a rest. This was not sufficient evidence to find that Cook was the operator, nor was it 
sufficient to conclude that a transfer of actual physical control from J.C. to Cook had 
occurred. 
The district court's analysis of the totality of the circumstances did not end there, 
however. It also found that Cook was exhibiting actual physical control because she was 
directing J.C. verbally, and also placing her hands on her shoulders to guide her in which way 
she should go if she needed it. There was no evidence presented that J.C.'s agency was 
overborne by Cook in these actions as operator of the vehicle. As a passenger, Cook had the 
right to give her child directions, just as the spouse in uuck. See, Benson at 868, citing uuck at 
855. Also as a passenger, Cook maintained a duty in that capacity to warn J.C. of an 
impending danger if J.C. was unaware of its presence. Id. However, the court erroneously 
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found these rights and duties to be indicators of a transfer of actual physical control for 
purposes of DUL 
Burton did not testify, nor was any evidence presented, that Cook had any control 
over the speed the vehicle was traveling, the starting or stopping of the vehicle, or any other 
element contributing to the vehicle's movement. Benson at 868, dting Shannon, 291 Ala. at 
163, 279 So.2d at 432. No evidence was presented, but it was required to show that Cook's 
directions or guidance made both J.C. and Cook in joint or common control of the vehicle. 
Id., tiling Bryant, 174 Cal. 737, 164 P. 385. Cook's mere directions to J.C. did not amount to 
control over the vehicle equal to that J.C. which was exercising. Benson at 869. J.C. was in 
control of how the vehicle was operated, regardless of any directions from Cook. To find 
otherwise would cause a precedent rendering intoxicated individuals guilty of DUI for taking 
a taxi cab and providing directions to the driver. Id. at 868-869, dting Churchi/4 225 Iowa at 
1190, 282 N.W. at 282 (quoting Cram, 185 Iowa 1292, 172 N.W. 23). Cook's mere giving of 
directions to J.C. does not establish that Cook had control over the vehicle. 8 Am.Jur.2d 
Automobiles§ 706. 
The ultimate factual finding, as well as the legal conclusion, that Cook was in actual 
physical control of the vehicle was in violation of the legal guidelines and should be 
corrected by this Court. R.ochcll, 850 P.2d at 485, dting Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1271-72. None of 
the evidence supports a finding that Cook either exercised actual physical control of the 
vehicle, nor that it was transferred to her from J.C. by any means. The court did not operate 
properly ,vithin its field of inquiry by theorizing and applying accomplice liability to its 
determination. No accomplice liability charge had been raised, nor was it applicable to this 
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case. In order for Cook to be an accomplice in aiding J.C., it required J.C. to be committing a 
crime, which is just a preposterous proposition. Barnhart, 850 P.2d 473; citing Richardson, 843 
P.2d at 521-22. 
This Court should correct such legal error by applying the appropriate field of inquiry 
to the detennination-that of actual physical control as applied to passengers respecting 
DUL See, Th11r111a11 at 1271-1272; Richardson, 843 P.2d at 522. The "legal content" of the 
findings and conclusions are flawed, and the district court's ultimately detennination in this 
matter was subsequently erroneous as a matter of law. LopeZJ 720 P.2d at 780; Garcia, 645 
P.2d at 653. 1bis Court should thus reverse the Judgment. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN FAILING TO FIND 
THAT THE OFFICER HAD PROPERLY CONDUCTED THE BAKER 
TEST GIVEN THAT NO INFORMATION AS TO SYNCRONIZATION 
OF DIFFERING TIMING DEVICES WAS PRESENTED TO ENSURE 
THE MANDATED 15 MINUTE TIME FRAME HAD BEEN 
UNDERTAKEN. 
1bis Court can exclude relevant evidence when "its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice." UT. R. EVID. 403. "A trial court's 
determination that there was a proper foundation for the admission of evidence ... [is 
reviewed for] an abuse of discretion. This means that we will reverse the trial court's 
decision to admit evidence only if the ruling is beyond the limits of reasonability." State v. 
Woodward, 2014 UT App 162,i] 14, 330 P.3d 1283; citing State v. Burke, 2011 UT App 168, ,I 
17,256 P.3d 1102 (alterations in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
In detennining whether evidence is admissible, UT. R. EVID. 104(b) states that, 
"[w]hen the relevance of evidence depends on whether a fact exists, proof must be 
introduced sufficient to support a finding that the fact does exist." UT. R. EVID. 401 states 
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that, "[e]vidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable 
than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the 
action." 
"Relevant evidence is presumptively admissible; irrelevant evidence is not" State v. Ashlry, 
2015 UT App 169, ,r 24, 357 P.3d 554; dting State v. Richardson, 2013 UT 50, ,r 24, 308 P.3d 
526. 
In order for Cook's BAC results to be admissible, "the State must present evidence, 
inter alia, that: (1) the intoxilyzcr machine had been properly checked by a trained technician, 
and that the machine was in proper working condition at the time of the test; (2) the test was 
administered correctly by a qualified operator; and (3) a police officer observed the 
defendant during the fifteen minutes immediately preceding the test to ensure that the 
defendant introduced nothing into his or her mouth during that time." State v. Vialpando, 
2004 UT App 95, ,r 14, 89 P.3d 209; See In re Oaks, 571 P.2d 1364, 1367 (Utah 
1977) (Maughan, J., dissenting) (citing State v. Baker, 56 Wash.2d 846, 355 P.2d 806, 809-10 
(1960) (articulating foundation elements for intoxilyzer tests)); see also Salt Lake City v. 
Womat~, 747 P.2d 1039, 1041 (Utah 1987) (affirming the necessity of the pre-test 
observation period). 
"The burden of demonstrating the admissibility of the proffered evidence is on the 
prosecution. The prosecution must lay a foundation upon which the trial court can make 
any necessary preliminary factual findings and reach any necessary legal conclusions. S fate v. 
RamireZi 817 P.2d 774, 778 (Utah 1991), tiling State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 890 (Utah 
1989); State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 463 (Utah 1988); State v. Wright, 745 P.2d 447, 451 (Utah 
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1987). The Due Process Clause of the Utah Constitution guarantees that "[n]o person shall 
be deprived of life, liberty or property, ,vithout due process of law." State v. GuZ!'lan, 2006 
UT 12, ,r 14, 133 P.3d 363 (Utah 2006). 
Rule 901 requires that the proponent of an item of evidence authenticate or identify it 
with "evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it 
is." State v. Woodward, 2014 UT App 162, ,r 16, 330 P.3d 1283; quoting UTAH R. EVID. 901(a). 
''Proper authentication does not require conclusive proof but, instead, requires only that the 
trial court determine that there is 'evidence sufficient to support a finding of the fulfillment 
of [a] condition' of fact." Id at ,r 17, dting State v. CD.L, 2011 UT App 55, ,r 24, 250 P.3d 
69 (quoting UTAH R. EVID. 104(b) (2011)) (alteration in original). 
In the instant matter, Burton testified that he had previous training on how to 
operate the Intoxilyzer. R106. Burton testified that the Intoxilyzer had been calibrated by a 
technician before and after Cook's BAC was given. Id The State submitted as evidence the 
calibration certificates for the Intoxilyzer. Id Burton testified during trial that he observed 
Baker on Cook at 14:34. R109. The BAC was then administered at 14:51. Rl 10. Burton 
testified that he "probably used his cell phone" to note the time of Baker but could not recall 
if that is what he had done. Burton pulled the time the BAC was administered off of the 
Intoxilyzer print-out. Id 
Burns objected to the admission of Cook's BAC test results based upon the 
testimony that two (2) separate time pieces were used and no testimony was offered as to 
whether the two (2) separate time pieces were at all synchronized. Rl 12. Burns also argued 
as part of his objection, that no testimony had been offered in regards to the specific amount 
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of time that elapsed between the time recorded and the time of Baker. Id. Burns argued 
that the Baker standard fifteen (15) minute time requirement was a strict compliance 
admissibility issue that was part of the foundational requirements for the BAC test results to 
be offered and submitted as evidence. R113. The trial court stated that evidence was 
offered to show that the fifteen (15) minute requirement had been met. R115. Specifically, 
the trial court stated that the fifteen (15) minute requirement had been met because of two 
(2) electronic devices that gave a two (2) minute cushion. Id. 
Further on voir dire, Burton stated that he did not use his cell phone to time the 
fifteen (15) minutes when he observed Baker. Id. Burton explained that the officer 
physically entered the time taken from another device into the Intoxilyzer. Id. The 
Intoxilyzer then counted down the fifteen (15) minutes from the time stamp that was 
entered. Burton assumed that the Intoxilyzer had its own time set but did not know for 
sure. R118. Burton stated that he was unsure where the Intoxilyzer pulled its time from 
because the Intoxilyzer was not plugged into an outside source such as the internet or a 
telephone line. Id. At the conclusion of trial, Burns declined to brief the issues of 
synchronization any further. R160. 
This Court can review the trial court's ruling that the State had meet its burden in 
laying the "proper foundational" requirements of Baker in order for Cook's BAC to be 
admissible evidence as an "abuse of discretion." See, Woodward at ,I 14 dting Burke at ,I 17. 
Cook's argument herein is that the State failed to adequately lay the proper 
foundational requirements on Baker in order for her BAC test results to be proffered as 
admissible evidence. See, Ramimz at 778, tiling Carter at 890; Bishop at 463 and Wright at 451. 
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In order for Cook's BAC to be admissible, the State needed to have presented evidence 
towards the three (3) foundational requirements set forth as part of the elements of Baker. 
Burton testified that the lntoxilyzer had been calibrated by a trained technician and that he 
[Burton] had been trained on how to properly operate the lntoxilyzer. R106. The 
calibration certificates were submitted by the State as evidence. Id. The State fulfilled the 
first two (2) requirements for Baker; however, they failed to properly meet the third 
requirement of the fifteen (15) minute observation period through Burton's testimony. See, 
Vialpando at ,r 14, dting Oaks at 1367, Baker at 809-10 and Salt Lake City at 1041. 
Burton first testified that he "probably had used his cell phone to note Baker." R110. 
Upon further questioning as to the timing issues, Burton testified that he "did not use his 
cell phone to time Baker." Id. Burton testified that the Intoxilyzer would count down the 
fifteen (15) minutes, after he manually entered in the time into the Intoxilyzer. R115. Now, 
based upon Burton's testimony, he could not recall where he pulled the time from. The 
information presented through Burton's testimony was very non-spe<;ific as to whether Baker 
ran from the time observed on the "unknown timing device" or the time it was entered on 
the Intoxilyzer. The facts presented confused the timing issue and were not clear and concise 
in order for the State to "lay a foundation" that would have allowed the trial court to have 
"reached legal conclusions" to accept Cook's BAC as admissible evidence. See, Ramirez at 
778, dting Carter at 890, Bishop at 463 and Wright at 451. Cook's Due Process right was 
violated without the necessary evidence proving that the two (2) differing timing devices 
utilized in observing Baker was sufficiently reliable in order to be admitted into evidence. 
See, Guzman at ,r 14; U.S. Const. Amend. XIV; Utah Const. Art. I§§ 7 and 12. 
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The time Baker was observed by Burton was recorded by him at 14:34. R109. It is 
unclear if Burton then typed 14:34 into the lntoxilyzer and that machine counted to 14:49 on 
its own internal clock or, instead, if the lntoxilyzer counted 15 minutes from a beginning and 
end point both on its own internal clock from the time Burton input information. Cook's 
BAC was administered at 14:51 by the Intoxilyzer clock, according to the Intoxilyzer print-
out sheet. R110. Further, the State failed to provide evidence identifying of the "unknown 
timing device" or any synchronization. Without these specifics, Burton could not lay 
sufficient foundation to fulfill the final requirement to deem Cook's BAC admissible under 
Baker. See, Vialpando at ,I 14, tiling Oaks at 1367, Baker at 809-10 and Womack at 1041. The 
Court's finding and conclusion that the 2 minute "cushion" rendered the Baker requirement 
met was arbitrary since two clocks can be more than 2 minutes off from one another, 
particularly where evidence indicates that the Intoxilyzer is not on a standard time since it is 
not connected to the internet or another device from which it obtains its clock. 
Cook's BAC should have been excluded as irrelevant evidence because it unfairly 
prejudiced her by lacking sufficient foundational support. UT. R. EVID. 403. The State bore 
the burden of establishing that the two timing devices were authenticated and synchronized. 
UT. R. EVID. 401 and 901; see, Woodward at ,I 16. The State did not present any testimony or 
evidence that would authenticate the synchronization of the two (2) timing devices in order 
to support a finding as to the fulfillment of the Baker three (3) step requirements for the 
admittance of Cook's BAC test results. See, CD.L at ,I 24. There was absolutely no 
authentication made. 
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The State's presentation of Cook's BAC results should have been excluded as lacking 
foundational support, and therefore nonadmissible and irrelevant to the proceedings. See, 
Ashby at ,I 24 quoting FJchardson at ,I 24. This Court should thus reverse the Judgment 
accordingly and, if found to be necessary, remand with direction to exclude such results 
from determination on the charges herein. 
III. BURNS RENDERED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL FOR 
FAILING TO FOLLOW-THROUGH WITH THE MOTION TO 
SUPPRESS THAT WAS FILED WITH REGARD TO UNREASONABLE 
DETAINMENT FOR INVESTIGATIVE PURPOSES. 
This Court and our Utah Supreme Court have previously stated that two (2) 
conditions should be met before they "\Vill consider the merits of a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel on direct appeal. In State v. HJ11JJjJhries, the Utah Supreme Court stated 
that "ineffective assistance of counsel should be raised on appeal if [1] the trial record is 
adequate to pennit decision of the issue and [2] defendant is represented by counsel other 
than trial counsel." Stale v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ,I 9, 12 P.3d 92, dting State v. 
Humphries, 818 P.2d 1027, 1029 (Utah 1991); see also State v. Hovater, 914 P.2d 37, 40 (Utah 
1996). "On appeal, it is the defendant's obligation to provide supporting arguments by 
citation to the record." Id at ,I 11. The U.S CONST . .A.MEND. VI provides for the following: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 
public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall 
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by 
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusations; to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for 
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his 
defense. 
In State v. Curry, the Utah Court of Appeals stated that "the Sixth Amendment, the Utah 
Constitution, and state statutory law ... guarantee an accused the right to be represented by 
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counsel." Ibid, 2006 UT App 390, ,I 6, 147 P.3d 483, citing State v. McDonald, 922 P.2d 776, 
779 (Utah App.1996); see also U.S. CONST. AMEND VI; UTAH CONST. ART. I, § 12; UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 77-1-6(1)(a) (2003). "[T]he Court has recognized that "the right to counsel is 
the right to the effective assistance of counsel." M1,Mann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771, 90 
S.Ct. 144, 125 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970). 
A defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel is discussed in State v. Houston as 
follows: 
The right to counsel under the Sixth . Amendment to the United States 
Constitution includes "the right to the effective assistance of counsel." 
In Strickland v. 1¥7ashington, the United States Supreme Court announced the 
two-part test for ineffective assistance of counsel claims. First, the defendant 
must show that ''his counsel rendered a deficient performance in some 
demonstrable manner, which performance fell below an objective standard of 
reasonable professional judgment." Second, the defendant must demonstrate 
"that counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant." 
Ibid., 2015 UT 40 ,110, 353 P.3d 55; citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 
2052. Utah has adopted the Strickland test and indicated "[t]o show ineffective assistance of 
counsel ... , a defendant must show (1) that counsel's performance was so deficient as to fall 
below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) that but for counsel's deficient 
performance there is a reasonable probability that the outcome ... would have been 
different." State v. Gailry, 2015 UT App 249 ,I14, --- P.3d ----, quoting State v. Smith, 909 P.2d 
236,243 (Utah 1995). 
A Motion to Suppress evidence shall contain the following: 
(1) describe the evidence sought to be suppressed; (2) set forth the standing of 
the movant to make the application; and (3) specify the sufficient legal and 
factual grounds for the motion to give the opposing party reasonable notice of 
36 
the issues and to enable the court to determine what proceedings are 
appropriate to address them. 
UT. R. CRIM. P. 12(d). The Utah Court of Appeals in Curry went on to further state that 
"[u]nder both the United States Constitution and the Utah Constitution, [Defendant] had 
the right to the assistance of counsel at all critical stages of his criminal proceeding." Ibid, 
2006 UT .App 390, ,I 6, 147 P.3d 483, citing Wagstaff v. Barnes, 802 P.2d 774, 778 (Utah 
.App.1990). ''The accused's right to the assistance of counsel during the critical stages of a 
criminal proceeding has long been recognized as a fundamental constitutional right." 
Wagstaff. 
In the instant matter, Burns filed a Motion with the trial court on July 16, 2015. 
R060. The Motion specifically requested the suppression of test results conducted. Id. 
During trial, after Burns questioned Burton on voir dire, he raised an objection. Rl 11. The 
objection raised was in regards to the B.AC results being offered and submitted as evidence. 
Id. Burns argued that Baker is a foundational admissibility requirement in order for BAC 
results to be offered as evidence. Rl 13. The State argued that Burns should have raised the 
admissibility issue prior to trial. Id. The trial court responded to the arguments made by 
counsel stating that Burns had in fact filed a Motion. Id. Burns' Motion was vague and did 
not contain details. Id. Burns admitted that "obviously he did not follow through with the 
Motion." Rl 14. Burns expressed to the trial court that during a suppression hearing, he 
would have addressed the aforementioned Baker issues. Id. 
The record is adequate for this Court's review, as set forth more particularly supra at 
.Argument IL Cook's arguments are supported by citations to the record. Id. at ,I 11. Thus 
this Court can evaluate Cook's ineffective assistance of counsel claim given that she is 
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represented by new counsel for her appeal herein. See, Litherland at ,I 9, and Humphries at 
1029. 
Cook maintained the right to the effective assistance of counsel. U.S. CONST. 
AMEND. VI; Curry at ,I 6, McDonald at 779; and UTAH CONST. ART I §12; McMann at 771; 
Houston at ,I 70. However, Burns' failure to follow-through with the Motion did not protect 
Cook's constitutional rights. Burns' failure fell below the objective standard of 
reasonableness. Id. This failure greatly prejudiced Cook because she went to trial without 
her Motion regarding the suppression of the BAC results. Id. Had Burns actually followed-
through and argued the Motion, there was a reasonable likelihood that the outcome of Cook's 
case could have been drastically different. See, Gailey at ,I 14 and Smith at 243. 
The Motion that Burns filed requested the suppression of evidence and set forth the 
standing that such Motion was applicable by the moving party. Specifically as Burns 
indicated, the Motion requested the suppression of Cook's BAC test results. R060. While 
Burns correctly followed the first two (2) requirements for this Motion, he neglected to 
articulate legal and factual grounds that gave weight and support to the evidence he was 
seeking be suppressed. See, UT. R. CRIM. P. 12(d). By articulating legal and factual grounds, 
it would have made the trial court aware that a suppression hearing on the Motion was in 
order. The trial court even stated that the Motion was "vague" and did not "provide details 
of what it contained." R113. Burns admitted during trial that he did not "follow-through 
with the Motion." R114. Burns performance in providing the trial court with a proper 
Motion containing relevant legal authority and a factual basis for the suppression of said 
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evidence fell below the reasonable standard of professional judgment and such perfoanance 
prejudiced Cook and her case. See, Gailf!J at,r 14 and Smith at 243. 
Cook had a c'right to effective assistance of counsel" during all "critical stages of her 
criminal proceedings.'' See, Cuny at ,I 6 and Wag.daft at 778. The cceffective assistance of 
counsel" during "critical stages" [was] a constitutional right Id. The Motion filed by Bums 
was very "critical" to Cook. During trial, Bums objected to the admission of the BAC test 
results based upon the Jack of foundational requirements set forth in Bak.er fo~:the ~sion 
of such evidence. Rt 13. B~s even expressed to the trial court that during a s~ppression 
hearing, he would have ccaddressed any issues with Baker." Rt 14. At trial, Bums only briefly 
argued his objection in regards to the Baker issues. A suppression hearing would have given 
Bums the time he needed to properly address the Motion, provide a well thought-out 
argument as to the merits of the Motion, and argue in-depth as to the issues the Motion 
raised At an evidentiaty hearing, Bums would have had a chance to thoroughly question 
Button as to the admissibility of the BAC test results. Had this Motion been heard prior to 
trial, Cook's case could have been impacted drastically. Failure to follow-through with the 
Motion and request a suppression hearing on the Motion deprived Cook of the 
constitutional right to ''effective assistance of counsel" U.S. CONST. AMEND. VI and UTAH 
CONST. ART I §12. This Court should thus reverse the Judgment and, if necessary, remand 
for correction of such violations. 
CONCLUSION 
WHEREFORE, based upon the foregoing, Cook respectfully requests that this Court 
reverse the Judgment based on the clearly erroneous findings of "actual physical control" 
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and the error as a matter of law in concluding Cook was guilty of DUI. Altematlvely, should 
this Court af£inn that issue, Cook requests that this Court reverse the Judgment and remand 
the matter for correction of the violation of her constitutional rights on the basis that., due to 
ineffectiveness of counsel, inadmissible evidence was admitted below with a lack of 
foundation that had a prejudicial impact on the outcome of the case. 
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Addendum ,_,A,_, 
Judgment, Sentence and Commitment, dated October 6, 2015. 
IN THE FIFIB DISTRICT COURT FOR 
IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
FILED 
40 Nonh 100 East, Cedar City, Utah 84nO 
43S-867-32S0 
OCT -6 2015 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
COURT 
DEPUTY C IRON COUNTY 
JUDGMENT, SENTENCE Jil-----
PROBATION ORDER vs. 
(Revised 09/1 S) 
Defendant. CriminalNo. /5€5DDODL( 
Judge Keith Barnes 
JUDGMENT 
The Defendant has been convicted of the following cr~inal offense(s): 
Count I: 06l1i"'1 tJ'#fcH.e :Io"tfw«e oi:: ,4 b,ha { • a class _.i misdemeanor. 
Count 2: _______________________ _. a class 
Count 3: a class 
Count 4: a class 
SENTENCE 
On this judgment, the sentence of the Court is as follows: 
misdemeanor. 
misdemeanor. 
misdemeanor. 
Count 1: 31,l{ days incarceration; $ ZS-bl> . ~o fine; plus 90% surcharge & $43 court security fee 
Count 2: ____ days incarceration; $ _____ fine; plus 90% surcharge & $43 court security fee 
Count 3: ____ days incarceration; $ _____ fine; plus 90% surcharge & $43 court security fee 
Count 4: ____ days incarceration; $ _____ fine; plus 90% surcharge & $43 court security fee 
Credit is given for ____ days incarceration already served. 
Multiple jail sentences shall be served ( ) concurrently ( )consecutively. 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
Execution of the sentence is stayed. You, the Defendant, will have 2L/ months of probation and you 
will be ( ) responsible to the Court ~ supervised by Priu,fe fl-ol:vJ>;, on these conditions: 
J Sign up for private probation within 48 hours. To be privately supervised for at least 6 months and may 
receive up to $240 credit to fine ifno violations. 
__j.. Obey all laws and commit no further law viol · ons. 
___1:.. Serve Z da~ injail, with credit for_-+---+days served; report to the Iron County Jail 
( ) immediately (0 by d-a.~ on-----~--.......... '--+-----' \.,,rfo serve straight time 
( ) to serve __ hours and then report on each ____ thereafter to serve hours until the 
sentence has been served, and obey all jail rules and policies while incarcerated. 
_____$Paya fine of$ 1 COO , including the 90% surcharge, and the court secufty fee of$$- to the 
Clerk of the ~rt,)° payments of at least $ $l) per month, on the day of each month, 
beginning }2 j_l ~ l~ .;jJlus interest at the legal rate. 
__ Pay$ _____ to the Clerk of Court for victim restitution, in payments of at least $ ____ per 
month, on the first business day of each month, beginning _____ _ 
~ Reimburse Iron County $/OD· oo for the services of your court appointed attorney. Payments received 
will be first credited to your obligation to pay victim restitution, then to reimburse Iron County for the 
services of your court appointed attorney and then to pay your fines and fees. 
Complete ___ hours of community service, at no fewer than ___ hours per month. File monthly 
written reports of hours completed; your first report is due _____ . ( ) Sign up with the Volunteer 
Center within __ hours and pay the required fee. 
J Obtain a written evaluation for ( ) mental health ¢() alcohol/drug abuse ( ) domestic violence ( ) anger 
management from a ~-approved professional counselor/therapist and file the evaluation with the Court on or 
before Ott,,.,l.tc \) . en complete all recommended counseling, treatment and therapy at your own expense, 
and file proof of completion. The cost of the evaluation and treatment, if recommended, will be credited toward 
your fine, to a maximum of$ ___ once you provide proof of payment and successful completion of treatment· 
Sign up for a life skills course within 48 hours, and complete it within 60 days. If complete within 30 days, the 
cost will be credited against your fine. 
Do not possess, distribute or use any illegal drugs or synthetic versions thereof, do not associate with persons 
who do so, and do not go to or remain at any location where such drugs are present. 
___:f.c Do not possess or consume any alcoholic beverages, including medications and energy drinks that contain 
alcohol, and do not go to any private location where alcohol is being served or any business where alcohol is the 
main item on the menu (such as a bar) and do not go to any location where alcohol is the chief item of sale (such 
as a liquor store). 
~ ___$,. Sign a consent to release treatment information form for all providers of mental or physical health care so that the 
Iron County Attorney and any person supervising your probation has access to your mental and medical health 
care records and may discuss you and your treatment with your mental or medical health care providers. 
~ Submit to warrantless searches of your person and property, and/or to testing of breath and/or bodily fluids, upon 
request of any probation officer, if your probation is being supervised by someone other than the court, or any 
law enforcement officer or anyone involved in providing any treatment ordered as a condition of probation. 
Write a letter of apology to the victim(s) and submit it to the Court and prosecutor within 30 days. 
Maintain full-time employment and/or education, schooling or job training. 
Have no contact or communication with ____________________ _ 
Attend the first review hearing with Judge Barnes on ________ at 9:00 am, and attend all other 
review hearings as ordered. 
~ Keep the Court advised of your current address at all times and notify the Court of any change of address within 
48 hours of the change. 
__:::t.. Submit a DNA sample to the State Department of Corrections and pay the fee. 
Exonerate bond. ___ Refund cash bail to payor. 
__ Other terms of probation: __________________________ _ 
Dated 
IF YOU FAIL TO MEET ANY OF THE ABOVE CONDITIONS, THE COURT MAY ISSUE A 
WARRANT FOR YOUR ARREST AND MAY REVOKE YOUR PROBATION. 
Defense counsel's withdrawal is granted. ~
16(~(,~ _ 
JUDGE KEITH C. BARNES 
COPY TO: 
, I(' County Attorney 
~C"N llil Defense Counsel 
Ill Defendant 
(8- Jail 
D Olhcr ___ _ 
(~) in court ) by hand ) mailed ) faxed 
(~) incoun ) by hand ) mailed ) faxed 
(~)incoun ) by hand ) mailed ) faxed 
(~incoun ) by hand ) mailed ) fa,-;ed 
( ) in court ) by hand ) mailed ) fa,-;cd 
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